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Globalization, Corporate Finance, and Coordinated Capitalism:
Pension Finance in Germany and Japan*
 
by Philip Manow 
 
 
Abstract
This paper analyzes 'globalization' as the interplay between domestic and 'foreign' economic agents that
seek to break up nationally contained and/or institutionally constrained markets with the aim of altering
distributive outcomes in their favor. I take as my exemplary cases the recent opening up of the Japanese
and German pension markets. US-Japan trade negotiations and European market integration provide
foreign competitors with entry into the pension market and increasingly allow domestic firms to exit the
national 'regulatory regime'. The internationalization of the market for investment capital has made
'regime exit' more attractive for many German and Japanese firms while the international convergence of
transparency rules and accounting standards are increasingly overhauling specific national business
practices.
 
 
 
Contents
1
2
 
3
 
4
Introduction
Pension finance, corporate finance, economic coordination, and the German
political economy
Pension finance, corporate finance, economic coordination, and the Japanese
political economy
Summary
References
 
 
 
1 Introduction
 
Financial markets today are certainly the most internationalized of all markets (Simmons
1998; Garrett 2000). It is here where globalization is most advanced. Today the level of
capital market integration has clearly surpassed the level prevalent in the early heydays of
'globalization,' which reached its first peak in 1914 (cf. Maddison 1991), while
international trade has only recently become as international as it once was in the first
decade of the twentieth century.
 
Japan and Germany, as the two most successful export nations of the world, were and still
are the foremost beneficiaries of the liberal postwar trade regime, yet their trade
performance seems to have been based to a considerable degree on national financial
systems that were not particular liberal in appearance. Japan's and Germany's financial
markets were for a long time during the postwar period 'nationally contained' and/or
institutionally constrained markets with state-regulation of revenue, public control of
investment flows, financial targeting, an important role of the public sector in savings and
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banking (postal savings, public saving banks, and saving and loan cooperatives), and a rich
legal and institutional framework that made capital more patient than the 'rest- and
reckless' capital in the Anglo-American variant of capitalism (cf. Zysman 1983; Shonfield
1965; Ziegler 2000). Both in Germany and Japan, capital tends to be less 'liquid,'
investments are of a long-term nature rather than oriented toward the highest revenue to be
realized in the shortest period of time. Stable cross-shareholding (cf. Wenger/Kaserer 1998:
505, Table 1) [1] underpins strategic alliances between firms and between firms and banks,
so that hostile takeovers were almost unheard-of events both in Germany and in Japan
until recently (for Germany see Prigge 1998: 992, Table 25). Private households show a
relatively high propensity to save and hold their savings predominantly in the form of bank
deposits, while private shareholding has only recently become more prominent in both
countries. The Japanese main bank system and the German Hausbank system gave
business access to these relatively patient and 'modest,' that is low-revenue expecting,
household savings. It thus buffered managers from shareholder control and allowed firms
to strategically enter into new markets and invest into new technologies with a long-term
perspective (cf. Aoki/Patrick 1994; Baums 1994; Sheard 1994). In this respect, the
financial systems of Germany and Japan clearly diverge from the model of equity based
corporate finance in which the stock market figures as the prime source of investment
capital - the model prevalent in the UK and the US. In fact, one of the most often
mentioned differences between the liberal Anglo-American and the non-liberal German
and Japanese market economies is that, in the former model, stock markets are at the
center of corporate finance (equity finance; 'outsider system,' 'external control'), while the
latter model can be characterized as bank-based systems (debt finance; 'insider system,'
'internalized monitoring'; Kaplan 1997; Franks/Mayer 1997; Hopt et al. 1998).
 
The recent liberalization of capital markets and the changes in corporate finance that are
associated with it can therefore be expected to be much less advantageous for the world's
two leading export nations than has been the postwar liberalization of goods markets.
Financial globalization threatens to undermine a crucial element of both the Japanese and
German political economy: the stable long-term relations between lender and borrower of
investment capital, and subsequently, the practices of long-term economic coordination
between managers and workers in so far as these practices critically depend upon
'revenue-satisficing' behavior rather than the revenue-maximizing behavior of capital.
Central for the long-term economic coordination in Germany and Japan was the
quid-pro-quo of workers' wage restraint given in exchange for employers' credible
commitment to reinvest the major part of the profits into the company, instead of paying
out high dividends to the company's (share-)owners. This 'cooperative' outcome of the
capital/labor game (Eichengreen 1994; Lancaster 1973) led in the long run to high
productivity growth (due to high investments), low inflation (due to wage moderation),
good export performance (due to the combination of high productivity and low inflation),
rising real wages and increasing employment, and brought about what in Germany has
been called Mengenkonjunktur and what in Japan analogously has been dubbed boom in
volume (Hamada/Kasuya 1993: 177). Since the mid-1970s, however, the traditional
manufacturing sectors have grown far less quickly and have even stagnated in terms of
employment. Given this, the 'taming' of investment capital that was once a particular
advantage of the German and Japanese political economies appears nowadays to have
turned into a liability: taming has turned into 'trapping'. If in the future German and
Japanese firms, in case they need to borrow money on an increasingly internationalized
capital market, will have to promise to reward capital with the same short-term, high 'rate
of return' that is guaranteed by their US-American competitors, the cooperative equilibrium
of the capital/labor game comes under strong pressure. Where low 'instantaneous' revenue
from investments does not translate anymore automatically into high growth rates over the
long run, investors become more interested in maximizing their short-term profit. They
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therefore become increasingly critical of all the institutional impediments for 'quick
in/quick out' types of investments, that is they become critical of exactly those institutional
features of the German and Japanese political economy that were central in the old
equilibrium for credibly committing capital to the cooperative strategy in the capital/labor
coordination-game. Thus, while the old comparative advantages of their non-liberal orders
diminish, the disadvantages (efficiency loss) that had always been tolerated are perceived
as less and less acceptable, and indeed today have become much costlier.
 
The cooperative equilibrium of the capital/labor game has produced particularly salient
'efficiency losses' in the German and Japanese pension systems since in both countries the
pension systems were used to stabilize inherited practices of economic coordination, to
safeguard trustful employment relations, and to provide firms with patient capital, at the
expense of the financial solidity and long-term viability of the pension systems themselves.
Yet, the pension systems in Germany and Japan have each been thrown into severe crisis
by
 
- the poor return from 'politically' motivated investments of Japanese pension capital or
from company pension 'book reserves' of German firms,
- the growing labor costs due to generous 'defined benefit' promises of German and
Japanese employers in the past,
- the massive use of early retirement provisions that allow German firms to adjust
inexpensively and 'peacefully' to a more unfavorable economic environment,
- and last but not least, the demographic consequences of an economic model that has
produced a distinctively gendered segmentation of the labor market and gendered
patterns of skill acquisition, and that has led the two political economies into a 'low
fertility equilibrium' (Esping-Andersen 1999: 67-70).
 
According to OECD estimates, the future liabilities of the German and Japanese pension
system amount to 200 or even 300 percent of GDP by 2030 (see Table 1). This contrasts
with the much better prospects for British and US-American pension systems.
 
 
Table 1: OECD estimates of financial liabilities of public pension programs (Germany,
Japan, the UK, and the USA)
 
 
Public pension
payments % of GDP
Net financial liabilities
in % of GDP
Increase in tax/GDP
ratio to keep net debt
constant
 1995 2030 1995 2030 2005 2030
Germany 11.1 16.5 44 216 2.8 9.7
Japan 6.6 13.4 11 317 3.5 9.6
UK 4.5 5.5 40 137 1.7 3.5
US 4.1 6.6 51 95 -0.3 5.3
Source: Disney (2000: 4); also see Tanzi/Schuknecht (2000).
 
 
It is therefore no surprise that the apparent superiority of the Anglo-American model of
corporate finance plays a prominent role in the domestic German and Japanese reform
discussions triggered by the changes in the cost/benefit ratio of their established economic
orders. And it is indeed here where the liberal systems seem to outperform the coordinated
political economies most clearly. US-American fund managers ridicule the poor
performance of Japanese investment firms and pension funds, and Germany until recently
was a conspicuous laggard with respect to the establishment of an 'equity culture' and to
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managers' regard for shareholder value. Not surprisingly, the superior performance of the
American model of financial capitalism has often been used as a lever against Japanese and
German ways 'to do (and finance) business.' In the US-Japan trade negotiations, the United
States has pressed for the opening up of the huge Japanese pension fund market while
German multinationals are increasingly forced to respond to the profit requests of powerful
institutional investors, prominent among them being US-American pension funds.
Moreover, German banks and insurance companies are being increasingly challenged by
their European competitors who have been much longer active in the private pension
business under a much more liberal regulative regime - a regime that is now being extended
through the 'harmonization' of the European market. Both German and Japanese
multinationals have to employ more and more the accounting standards and transparency
rules proscribed by the US-American Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) or the
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) if they want to avoid paying a risk
premium for their access to the international capital market (Clark et al. 2000, 2000a).
These standards clearly discriminate against the nonfunded or underfunded, defined
benefit corporate pension schemes prevalent in Germany and Japan that have been used
extensively in both countries for enhancing human capital and personnel management,
specifically as a means to instigate investments into firm-specific skills and to secure low
job turnover. Yet, "global markets may not appreciate these virtues when 'pricing' German
[or Japanese] firms" (Clark et al. 2000a: 2, my addition). By assigning all investment risks
to the firm, defined benefit schemes are perceived as less transparent than defined
contribution schemes, which by definition cannot run into a deficit. [2] To the contrary,
defined contribution plans "shift costs and financial risks to plan participants away from
firm stockholders and management" (Clark et al. 2000: 7). To this come the increasing
costs of administering DB pension plans. New US-American accounting standards like the
FASB statement 87 have been associated with a trend in the US-pension market away from
DB-schemes and toward DC-schemes. The same can be expected to occur in Germany and
Japan with the spread of these 'generally accepted practices' to these countries. To uphold
the established practices of worker/management cooperation - underpinned by workers'
stable expectations about future income and by generational fairness between different
cohorts of workers of a firm (see below) - has thus become much costlier, in fact too costly
for many firms.
 
Yet, the spread of Anglo-American 'best practice' in corporate finance is a process not only
suffered, but often also endorsed by domestic German and Japanese actors, who have
become increasingly upset with poor revenue from their investments, with restricted access
to venture capital, with the meager performance of pension funds or the almost total
absence of a private pension market. Especially private banks and insurance companies
worry about their comparative disadvantages vis-a-vis their Anglo-American competitors
due to the multiple restrictions and market distortions they have to face in their home
markets. The changes in pension finance in Japan and Germany are thus prime examples
for the fact that globalization is not simply an 'external economic threat' to an economy but
often works through "transnational alliance building, in which domestic actors find allies
abroad" to further their specific domestic interests (Ziegler 2000: 197).
 
Yet, if the Japanese and German welfare states in general and their pension systems in
particular have crucially contributed to the long-term stability of economic coordination
(cf. Manow 2000, 2001) while at the same time this economic side-function has
undermined their long-term sustainability, we are led to ask whether the (financial) crises
of the German and Japanese welfare states and the political responses triggered by them,
combined with financial market liberalization, will have a significant impact on the
long-established practices of economic coordination in both countries.
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To answer this question, this paper will sketch the story of the 'rise and demise' of the
production/protection nexus in Germany and Japan with a particular focus on the role that
pension finance has played in corporate finance, [3] corporate governance, and industrial
relations. I will describe some of the consequences for the German and Japanese pension
systems following from the fact that they have been deeply embedded in and have
'functionally' contributed to economic coordination in both political economies. Thus, the
paper shares an interest in exploring the systematic nexus between 'different variants of
capitalism' and 'different worlds of welfare' with a number of recent contributions to the
comparative political economy literature (Hall/Soskice 2000; Estevez-Abe et al. 1999;
Mares 1997, 1997a, 2000; Iversen 2000; Huber/Stephens 2001; Swenson 1999, 2000;
Ebbinghaus/Manow 2001; Manow 1997, 2000, 2001a).
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 will briefly sketch the history of the postwar
reconstruction of the German pension system and its impact on corporate finance and
industrial relations. I will then describe how much the recent changes in the public and
private pension system will challenge core features of the established model of German
capitalism. Section 3 addresses the challenge to the Japanese model of corporate finance
that is posed by the deregulation of the Japanese pension fund market. In particular, I will
look at the interaction effects among the liberalization of the financial sector, reforms of
pension fund regulation, and changes in corporate finance in Japan. Section 4 will give a
short outlook on the 'life expectancy' of economic coordination German and Japanese
style in a time of international capital markets.
 
 
2 Pension finance, corporate finance, economic coordination, 
and the German political economy
 
To provide the reader with a short account of the role that the private and public pension
systems have played in the development of the German political economy, we have to
briefly describe the early postwar period in which both public old-age insurance and
company pensions were re-established. This period ended with the important 1957 pension
reform.
 
The most pressing problem for the West German postwar government was to provide the
12 million refugees who arrived from the East between 1945 and 1955 with housing and
employment. This was an especially problematic task since Allied bombing had caused
enormous damage in many big German cities - while less so to the old industrial centers of
the Reich. To handle the housing problem, massive government intervention seemed
indispensable. Compared with Japan, Germany certainly did experience a more profound
break with the etatist practices of the war economy and after the war came to embrace a
basically liberal economic policy. Still, the German government in the early 1950s engaged
in quite substantial economic steering in cooperation with industry and its well-established
institutions of self-governance (see Shonfield 1965: 260; Adamsen 1981). The granting of
special tax privileges to selected sectors of the economy became an important tool of
economic policy and the government's least interventionist practice. Given the high level of
taxation prevalent in postwar Germany, this strategy proved to be quite effective. [4]
Especially the construction sector enjoyed special tax privileges as a support for the quick
reconstruction of the large German cities.
 
The preferential tax treatment of investments in housing and 'basic industries,' in turn,
hindered the German stock market from developing into the prime source for investment
capital. This was because the government at the same time had restricted maximum
revenue from stocks in order to make investment in government bonds, construction loans,
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or private saving more attractive (Giersch et al. 1994: 83-84). [5] Long-term interest rates
were subject to state regulation, which limited interest on mortgage to 5 percent p.a. and
interests on industrial bonds to 6.5 percent p.a.. Since rent control was perceived as
absolutely indispensable given the extreme shortage of housing, the state sought to
minimize the attractiveness of alternative investments. Yet, control of interest on industry
bonds meant that "the emission of securities played no more than a marginal role for
business finance" (Giersch et al. 1994: 83). Thus, business was in need of other sources of
capital. Again, tax privileges were employed to alleviate the capital shortage.
 
Already the Tax Law Adjustment Acts of June 1948 and April 1949 had granted massive
tax incentives for savings and investments. "In 1950 the total amount deducted from
individual and corporate income tax according to para. 7 (a)-(e) Income Tax Law was
about 0.9 billion DM, i.e. 4.2 percent of the aggregate gross income of all individual and
corporate tax returns. Forty-eight percent of this amount was expenditure on repairing
war-damaged equipment, and about 30 percent were housing loans. These numbers suggest
that tax privileges had great importance for capital formation" (Giersch et al. 1994: 60-61;
also see Adamsen 1981: 45-50). Thus, firms came to cover their capital needs mainly
through bank credit (backed by private saving) or retained profits (Adamsen 1981: 45-50
and 257). [6] An important part of these tax privileges became the preferential treatment of
company pension schemes (Kersten 1959; Kempkes 1964).
 
In order to compensate business for its restricted access to the capital market, the
government allowed firms to hold private company pensions as book reserves, i.e. merely
in form of an account position that reported a firm's financial commitment in this respect
(cf. von Wartenburg 1992). Book reserves became a "means of recycling employer pension
contributions as self-managed self-investment funds" (Clark et al. 2000: 22). Company
pensions in the form of book reserves were subject to taxation only at the time of payment.
The tax privilege thus was considerable (DB-Research 1999: 30; Bundesbank 2001), and
in light of this it is not surprising that still today (1997) 56 percent of all company pensions
are granted in the form of direct entitlements toward the firm covered by 'book reserves'
(and not, for instance as in Japan, as payments of a firm on behalf of their employees to an
insurance company that then later pays out pensions to the retired worker; DB-Research
1999: 14). Note that the whole arrangement not only benefited employers by providing
them with a source of cheap and 'unmonitored' internal credit, but also provided workers
with the assurance that profits would indeed be reinvested, thus leading to productivity
growth that in the longer run could translate into real wage increases (cf. Eichengreen
1994). In effect, workers became quasi co-owners of a firm with an interest in the
long-term profitability of investments. While company pensions as a fringe benefit for the
core skilled (male) workforce increased average job tenure, made the acquisition of
firm-specific skills in addition to the acquired industry-wide skills less risky for the
individual worker (Estevez-Abe et al. 1999), and gave the German work councils a role in
negotiating the 'social wage,' it also provided a rationale for wage moderation both at the
firm- and the industry-level. Work councils, which in the German 'dual system' (see Thelen
1991) are prohibited from bargaining over wages, became interested in having the wages
set in the collective bargaining between unions and employer associations leave enough
room for a positive add-up on top of the sector wage in form of company pensions or other
'gratifications' paid by the individual firm (in contrast to wages, work councils can
negotiate with management about these fringe benefits). Hence, work councils represented
an important faction within the unions that had an interest in moderate collective wage
demands. Data on wage drift in the 1950s and 1960s indicate that the wages set in
collective bargaining were indeed moderate enough to leave maneuvering room at the level
of the individual firm (Paque 1995: 25, Figure 1). Yet, granted in form of pension
entitlements, these benefits were to be reinvested so as to increase future pension
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entitlements and real wage growth. That pensions were most often 'defined benefit' (and
followed seniority) burdened employers with the entire investment risk and minimized
problems of 'intergenerational justice' between different cohorts of workers. Company
pensions established a "social contract between successive generations of company
workers" (Clark et al. 2000: 22; Eichengreen 1994).
 
In the early period of economic recovery, tax-privileged capital retained for 'social
purposes' accounted for around 75 percent of all business self-financing, and the share of
self-financing varied according to industry between 50 and 90 percent of total investments
(Kerstner 1959: 34). Where company welfare schemes historically had played a bigger
role, in particular in the heavy industry of the Ruhr region, capital earmarked for company
pensions amounted to almost 70 percent of total company capital (ibid.). Since these
private pension schemes were far from mature in the 1950s and 1960s, and since the
turnover, profits, and workforces of companies continued to grow quickly until the early
1970s, company pension schemes represented a particularly cheap source of internal credit
that enabled rapid business expansion. Compared with retained profits (in the form of
tax-privileged company pensions), the issuing of bonds as a means to finance new
investments was clearly less attractive. Until the mid-1950s, a free market for bonds in
West Germany virtually did not exist. The Kapitalmarktförderungsgesetz (Law for the
Encouragement of the Capital Market) of 1952 had lifted the interest ceiling on bonds, but
industrial bonds were still subject to discriminatory taxation unlike bonds issued by public
authorities. Private savings and retained profit continued to benefit from tax exemptions as
well. Moreover, private saving was to some degree inelastic, i.e., private households
showed a high propensity to save despite relatively low interest rates. The lack of an easy
access to the stock market for private households played a role in this respect, too.
 
With respect to the postwar shortage of investment capital, the public pension insurance
could not be used like the way the capital of the Japanese Employee Pension System (EPS)
was used by the Ministry of Finance's (MoF) trust fund bureau (see below). There were
several reasons for this. Firstly, the 1948 currency reform had affected not only private
savings and life insurance, but also the public pension system. For the second time since
the great inflation of 1922/23, the German old-age insurance had lost almost all of its
financial assets. [7] Secondly, even when the old-age insurance started again to accumulate
capital in 1949, the investment of pension capital in stock or the provision of credit to firms
was legally prohibited, let alone a political use of pension capital to support strategic
sectors of the economy or for investments into the public infrastructure like in Japan. The
investment of pension fund capital had been heavily regulated by the state ever since the
establishment of the public schemes in the 1880s. Painful experiences made during the
crash of the early 1870s (Gründerkrach), which had led to the collapse and bankruptcy of
many banks and workers mutual funds, had left their mark on the young Bismarckian
welfare state. Investment of pension capital was restricted to supposedly secure, risk-free
(however: low-revenue) investments (mündelsichere Anlage according to Articles
1807-1808 BGB [Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch - Civil Code]), that is to public bonds, loans to
housing associations, and real estate. Investments into equities were illegal. [8]
 
After World War II, these provisions remained largely in place. [9] As a consequence,
pension insurance capital in the 1950s was primarily invested in loans to housing
cooperatives, in public bonds of the municipalities and the central government, and in
normal bank deposits (BMA 1956, 1957, 1961). The capital assets of the social insurance
schemes that were held in bank deposits, in turn, "greatly strengthen(ed) the ability of the
banks to grant credit to their customers" in the early 1950s (Giersch et al. 1994) and thus
underpinned the emerging stable bank-company relations that were to become so
characteristic for the German political economy. Finally, the pension reform of 1957
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changed the mode of pension financing from a fully funded system to a (modified) pay-as-
you-go scheme. Thereafter, capital assets of the old-age insurance had the sole purpose to
secure the basic liquidity of the system. The size of the legally mandated reserve that was
to be held by the old-age insurance was reduced step by step, until in 1969 the reserve limit
was set at no more than the equivalent of a one-month pension payment (Drittes
Rentenfinanzierungsänderungsgesetz). This is why the overall volume of accumulated
capital remained rather small (today between DM 20 and 30 billion, $10.75 and 16 billion)
and why, given the concern for the short-term availability of the reserve, the capital could
not be held in the form of equities.
 
The economic slowdown that began in the early 1970s, combined with stricter regulation
of company pensions (since 1974), has rendered company pension schemes less and less
attractive for business. In this context it is probably of less importance that the
Betriebsrentengesetz (Company Pension Act 1974) and court rulings in the early and late
1980s forced employers to adjust pensions to inflation every three years, and restricted the
employers' 'freedom of design' in questions of eligibility, [10] since these rulings made the
pension promises not only more costly, but at the same time also more credible. The same
holds true for stricter vesting rules introduced 1974. [11] Instead, firms had to reconsider
the profitability of company pensions against the background of the growing maturity of
these schemes and the changing age-composition of their workforce. Most importantly,
with lower economic growth rates, industry wages set in collective bargaining tended to
absorb an ever higher share of the productivity gains. Therefore the dualism between
sectorwide wages negotiated between the employer association and the industrial union
plus a top-up at the firm-level negotiated between the management and the work council
proved less and less viable. Yet, this dualism had been so important for the combination of
industry-wide vocational training plus the acquisition of firm specific skills through long
job tenure (cf. Soskice et al. 1998; Estevez-Abe et al. 1999) upon which the German
production model is based. While companies had enjoyed strictly positive returns from the
establishment of company pension schemes in the early expansion period of the 1950s and
1960s, the cost/benefit ratio today is much less clear, if not outright negative. The coverage
of company pensions decreased from 67 percent in 1981 to 61 percent in 1987 and has
stabilized today around 64 percent with stagnant benefits.
 
What is true with respect to the diminishing wage drift, which in the past had allowed
companies to provide their workers with additional welfare, holds also for the public
pension insurance. The rising costs of the public scheme make it increasingly hard for
companies to grant workers additional entitlements on a voluntary basis. Total social
insurance contributions have risen from 26.5 percent of gross wages in 1970 to over 40
percent in the early 1990s. The contribution rate to the public pension scheme alone was
first raised in a sequence of rapid contribution hikes between 1968 and 1973 from 14
percent to 18 percent. It was then raised to more than 20 percent in the 1990s in the wake
of Germany's unification crisis. Thus, contributions to the public pension scheme account
for more than half of the excessive burden put on wages by the German welfare state. [12]
As a consequence and contrary to the proclaimed will of the government to strengthen
company pensions as the 'second pillar' of old-age insurance, public pensions have become
ever more important in recent years and increasingly crowd out the private schemes.
Today, 89 percent of male employees and 70 percent of female employees in West
Germany will receive a public pension at old age. For the coming cohorts, this share will
further increase (to 95 percent and 94 percent respectively). In the former East Germany,
already almost 100 percent of the workforce will receive a public pension (VDR 1999).
Yet, only 36 percent of all male employees in West Germany and only 9 percent of all
female employees receive a company pension at retirement. In East Germany, figures are
even lower (4 and 2 percent, respectively). Entitlements differ considerably in their level as
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well. The average private pension benefit for a male employee (DM 632 per month) is
more than twice as high as for a female employee (DM 302 as of 1996). However, both
figures are inflated since they include retirement payments to the middle and upper
management. Even though public pensions became more important 'in scope and scale'
(i.e., with respect to coverage and entitlement levels) than the private schemes, company
pensions today still play an important role for corporate finance. The continuing
importance of company pensions for corporate finance may be demonstrated by the
following numbers: Between 1980 and 1990, German firms issued new equity valued at a
total of DM 126.1 billion. This is roughly comparable with company financing by means of
pension reserves, which increased during the same period by about DM 120 billion (Hauck
1994: 556; for similar data for the time period 1982 - 1993, see DB-Research 1999: 1).
Total book reserves earmarked for company pensions in 1994 were equivalent to 33
percent of the stock market value of all listed domestic firms. Pension reserves still amount
to 10 percent of the balance sheet total of German firms or to DM 240 billion in 1990.
They amount to around 50 percent of all company capital of German firms (DB-Research
1999: 7). The easy access to cheap internal capital thus remained important to companies
beyond early postwar years of rapid economic growth and capital scarcity.
 
Voluntary private social expenditures are marginal compared to the statutory programs and
are very likely to remain so in the future. Company pensions contribute 5 percent to the
old-age income of a German worker, while they contribute about 25 percent in the United
Kingdom (DB-Research 1999: 9 and 15). The different public/private mixes in Germany,
on the one hand, and in the US and UK, on the other (comparable data on Japan were not
available), are shown in Table 2.
 
 
Table 2: Social expenditure indicators 1993-1995, as a percentage of GDP
 
  
Germany UK US
1993 1995 1993 1995 1993 1995 
Public social
expenditure 
23.0 23.1 19.6 19.3 15.8 16.1
Mandatory private
social expenditure
0.9 0.9 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.5
Voluntary private
social expenditure
0.7 0.7 2.8 3.1 7.2 7.1
Total social
expenditure
24.6 24.7 22.6 22.7 23.5 23.7
Source: OECD, SOXCs Data set.
 
 
With the decreasing attractiveness of company pensions as a source of internal credit and
with the increasing costs of the statutory schemes, many firms feel 'trapped' in a system
that they once perceived as especially advantageous. Particularly small and medium
enterprises are upset with the status quo since they are much less able to make efficient use
of the multiple pathways into early retirement that the German public pension insurance so
generously provides and that enables firms to downsize and rejuvenate their workforce
without risking much shop-floor unrest. Smaller firms are much more dependent on older
workers with their skills and their experience, and they are less able to use early retirement
as an instrument of personnel policy (Mares 1997). Hence, a growing number of firms
think they would be better off if they could link wages and welfare benefits more tightly to
the firm's economic performance and thus opt out of an industrial relation- and production-
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system crucially based upon sectorwide economic coordination. Their interests coincide
with those of German banks and big insurance companies who have realized that old-age
insurance has an enormous market potential if only the encompassing and generous public
scheme would allow more room for private initiative. German banks and the insurance
industry increasingly perceive the broad coverage and relative generosity of public
pensions as 'foregone profit' and as a main factor for their comparative disadvantage
relative to their Dutch, British, or Irish competitors who have long been active in the
pension fund business and thus have acquired much more experience. In this context,
European market integration is of crucial importance, in particular since the Capital
Liberalization Directive will contribute to a further 'de-nationalization' of the life-insurance
and private pension market in the coming years, and will lead - if not to the harmonization
of tax rules - at least to a uniform regulation of investments, portability, and vesting (cf. FT
12/11/1998, p. 4; Davis 1995: 262-265; EU-Greenbook 1997). This most prominently
includes uniform 'prudent man' investment standards, which measured against the
restrictive German practice will bring about a significant liberalization. For instance,
German regulations stipulate that mutual insurances (Pensionskassen) can hold no more
than 35 percent of their total assets in equities. In fact, in 1998 only 9 percent of their
totals assets were domestic or foreign equities, whereas the percentage for British pension
funds that operate under much more liberal rules was 75 percent of total capital
(DB-Research 1999: 12 and 20). The European Commission aims to replace the restrictive
German quantitative rules with the much more flexible qualitative 'rules of prudence'
under which British or Dutch pension funds are allowed to operate. Moreover, the
European Commission has also announced that it is preparing a proposal "requiring all EU
listed companies to prepare their consolidated accounts in accordance with ... International
Accounting Standards" (quoted from Clark et al. 2000: 6). IAS will be binding for all
European listed companies from 2005 on (FAZ 14.2.2001). Since 1998, German firms have
been allowed to use FASB or IASC standards, and larger firms have been very quick in
adopting these standards even though the majority of them are still not listed on either the
London or New York stock exchange (Clark et al. 2000: 16). Yet, these standards provide
firms with strong incentives to switch from defined benefit plans to defined contribution
plans despite the fact that defined contribution plans cannot provide workers with the kind
of benefit predictability and benefit equality so critical for the functioning of long-term
economic coordination. [13]
 
Thus, German banks and insurance companies perceive the crisis of the public scheme as
an opportunity to gain market shares in the promising new market of private pensions. The
recent pension reform, which will introduce partial funding of pension entitlements for the
first time since World War II and which will allow the establishment of pension funds
(although these will not be fully designed along the line of the British or US-American
model), proves that the government as well sees the funding and privatizing of pensions as
a chance to fight the crisis of the public scheme and, at the same time, to strengthen the
domestic financial sector within the new European market. According to estimations, the
2001 pension reform will lead to the build-up of capital stock equaling DM 64 billion
within the next six years. This is not an overly impressive figure if compared with the total
volume of investment fund capital (DM 90 billion in 1999) or private life insurance (DM
110 billion in 1999; DB-Research 1999), yet the new pension capital will have a
recognizable effect on the German stock market. Thus, the demographic pressures exerted
on the German pay-as-you-go system are not the only factors prompting the government to
seek to stimulate growth of private pensions as a substitute for social security. The crisis of
the German public pension system coincides with the opening of the German insurance
market under EU law (Capital Movements and Capital Liberalization Directive; cf. Rabe
1997) and the interest of powerful domestic economic players to move out of an
'equilibrium' that for most of the postwar period was based upon the 'institutional taming' of
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investment capital. The interplay between changed domestic constellations of interests and
external pressures has already led to a visible erosion of Germany's stakeholder model of
corporate governance (Ziegler 2000). The reform of the public pension system has to be
understood in this context, in particular together with the recent reform of the tax code in
which banks selling their holdings are exempted from paying taxes for the significant
profits thus generated. Stable shareholding German style apparently has lost most of its
charm. The reform of pension finance indicates that Modell Deutschland is currently
undergoing fundamental, structural change. [14] Yet, the reform of coordinated capitalism -
as we will see in the next section - appears to be even more profound in Japan.
 
 
3 Pension finance, corporate finance, economic coordination, and the
Japanese political economy
 
Postwar Japan also practiced a sophisticated 'social control of consumption'. As in
Germany, the Japanese government discriminated against consumption after the war while
supporting investments into heavy industry and public infrastructure. High levels of private
savings were channeled into 'strategic sectors,' key industries, and important infrastructure-
projects, which had been pre-selected by the central bureaucracy. Interest rates were
strictly controlled. Again like in Germany, these "controls created subsidies for priority
sectors in the form of low interest rates, which in turn necessitated the control of bank
deposit rates" (Uede 1999: 93). Interest rates on government bonds set the pattern for the
rates on corporate bonds, and the former were held at artificially low levels. High rates of
private saving, limited options to hold these savings, and the political usage of this capital
helped provide business with inexpensive and relatively patient capital. This, in turn, was
one of the crucial preconditions for the stability of a production regime that was critically
based upon stable employment patterns, the acquisition of firm-specific skills, and the
exchange between wage moderation and a high investment rate.
 
In postwar Japan, Postal Savings and Postal Life Insurance were the most important
instruments by which the state fostered high private household saving rates and was able to
siphon capital into strategic sectors of the economy. In the absence of well-developed
social insurance programs in the 1950s, these were the few options for citizens who wanted
to save for their old age. The capital of Postal Savings was (and still is) transferred to the
Fiscal Investment and Loan program (FILP) under the administrative responsibility of the
Ministry of Finance (MoF) and its trust fund bureau. The same is true for the capital of the
Employee Pension System (Kosei Nenkin Hoken, KNH), which was originally founded in
1941 and re-established in the early 1950s. FILP is the important shadow budget of the
Japanese government, roughly half as big as the official budget, but entirely beyond
parliamentary control. Decisions over the FILP funds are the sole prerogative of the
government, in particular of the MoF's trust fund bureau.
 
Yet, the increasing complaints by business about total government control over the capital
that was levied from employers and employees by the Employee Pension System
motivated the government in 1964 to establish Employee Pension Funds (Kosei Nenkin
Kikin, KNK; starting in 1966). Employee Pension Funds offered firms the opportunity to
contract out of the public scheme. Given the consent of the company union and given the
fulfillment of certain requirements (e.g., 30 percent higher benefits than those paid by the
Employee Pension System), a firm was allowed to opt out of EPS and to hand the company
pension fund over to a life insurance company or trust bank (Watanabe 1998; Estienne
1999). A firm could opt out of the EPS but then had to contract out the pension fund to a
life insurance company or trust bank. This means that, contrary to Germany, large firms
were not allowed to run internal schemes (for instance, in the form of book reserves). [15]
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This took into account unions' concerns about the potential misuse of company pensions as
paternalistic devices to control and discipline workers. Especially, the contracting-out
provision represented a credible commitment of employers to honor in the future the
pension promises given at the time and it reduced the dependence of employees on
employers in a labor market based on 'internal careers,' where exit and job switches were
rare events. But the provision also served the MoF's goal to support the domestic life
insurance industry and the banking sector.
 
The Japanese government had taken measures to support the life insurance industry even
before 1964. In 1947, it had licensed life insurance companies to sell Group Insurance
Plans; and in 1962, the government introduced Tax Qualified Corporate Pension Plans,
which again only life insurance companies and trust banks were allowed to handle. Similar
to German company pensions, Tax Qualified Pensions offered primarily small- and
medium-sized firms an opportunity to inexpensively finance their investments out of
retained profit. Thanks to these administrative measures, the Japanese life insurance
industry grew rapidly and today is one of the largest in the world, while also being one of
the least confronted with foreign competition (Estevez-Abe 2001: 11). [16] With 71
percent of premium income earned and 77 percent of assets held by the seven largest
companies, the Japanese life insurance market is also "the most highly concentrated (…)
among developed nations" (Probert 2001: 5).
 
However, government regulation of the emerging pension market did not only support the
domestic life insurance industry. The government had also developed an interest in
forestalling 'excessive competition' between firms for scarce labor in times of high growth
and full employment through ever more generous company welfare schemes. Tight state
regulation of pensions was supposed to help prevent intense 'welfare drift' from emerging.
Firms had an interest in 'standardizing' careers based on long-term labor contracts.
'Employer hopping' or poaching among employers for scarce (skilled) labor was to be
avoided. This meant also to standardize the welfare entitlements and to link them to
seniority and job tenure. Thus, contracting out pensions did not mean that Japanese
pensions were privatized or liberalized. Legislation had subjected the funds to tight and
uniform regulation, including the pooling of funds and the stipulation of a uniform revenue
rate for all out-contracted pension funds (the rate was set at 5.5 percent annually and
remained at that level for almost thirty years; in April 1994 it was cut to 4.5 percent, then
to 2.5 in April 1996 and finally to 1.5 percent in 2000; Probert 2001: 11, Fn. 19; see
Estienne 1999, 1999a; Watanabe 1998). Later, the government also ordered the indexation
of private pensions and strictly linked the EPF pensions to the movement of benefits in the
public EPS pensions (Estienne 1999: 94). Moreover, the state regulation of the 'private'
contracted out schemes secured that company welfare was more than a simple fringe
benefit granted and withdrawn by employers at will, that it was more than a voluntary
commitment that could be expected to be revoked in the next economic downturn. While
especially large companies were able to stabilize their workforce by offering more
favorable provisions as compared with the public schemes, the state continued to tightly
regulate company welfare, forced uniform standards upon the larger part of the industry,
and lent credibility to the promises of business. The state played the role of a "direct
structurer and overseer of occupationally-linked pensions" (Shinkawa/Pempel 1997: 170;
cf. Estienne 1999: 94).
 
Japan's dual industrial structure had been replicated in the dual structure of the Japanese
welfare state. Once they had the opportunity, most large firms chose to opt out of the
Employee Pension System, while workers in the many small- and medium sized firms
usually remained in the EPS and/or enjoyed the preferential tax treatment of the Tax
Qualified Pensions, while self-employed workers most often were members of the National
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Pension System. Within this system, lower premiums, less co-payment, higher benefits
prevailed in the statutory 'public' company schemes (EPS), and even more generous were
the contracted-out company schemes in health and pension insurance (EPF), while residual
provisions, lower benefits, and longer qualifying periods prevailed in the lower tier of the
public pension and health program (National Pension System [NPS, 1959] and National
Health Insurance [NHI, 1938/1958]; Estevez-Abe 1996; Estienne 1999). Government
regulation of pension funds helped the standardization of company-based social benefits in
very much the same way as Germany's public pension scheme did for German pattern
wage bargaining. Yet, the out-contracted pension funds, which were based on the 'defined
benefit'- and seniority-principle like German public pensions, established "intra-company
inter-generational solidarity," whereas the German pension system established
"society-wide inter-generational solidarity" (Estevez-Abe 1996: 9). Because this intra-firm
solidarity was based on income redistribution from younger to older workers, "workers had
an added incentive not to quit before they began receiving back their share of the
contributions" (ibid.).
 
In this context it is important to distinguish between the public provision and the public
regulation of social welfare, and it is often highlighted as a distinctive feature of the East
Asian welfare regimes that they tend to put particular emphasis on regulation rather than
provision (Jacobs 1998; Goodman et al. 1998). The common assumption that the private
provision of social benefits automatically is proof of the liberal, 'commodifying' character
of a welfare state regime (Esping-Andersen 1990; for Japan especially see Esping-
Andersen 1997: 183) ignores this important difference and underestimates the degree to
which 'private' but publicly regulated welfare schemes differ in their impact on the market
from what would have been obtained as a pure market 'liberal' equilibrium. Although at a
glance they resemble US-American welfare capitalism in many respects, Japan's 'private'
company pension schemes differ profoundly, given the high degree of governmental
regulation that secure similar entitlements across firms and industries. One indication for
this is that the EPF pensions are inflation-indexed, 'defined benefit' schemes in contrast to
'defined contribution' schemes like the US-American 401(k) pensions. In a detailed
assessment of the Japanese pension funds, Jean-Francois Estienne thus concludes that
'contracting out' in the case of the Kosei Nekin Kikin (EPF) appears "in a version quite
different from the Anglo-American model, since there exist links between the private and
the public schemes both in organizational terms and in terms of performance" (Estienne
1999: 94; my translation). Within the Japanese "welfare production regime" (Estevez-Abe
et al. 1999), the Japanese welfare state came to underpin business coordination much more
than purely voluntary schemes would have been able to do.
 
Again, as in the German case, pensions also helped firms get access to relatively patient
capital. One of the initial motives for the introduction of Employee Pension Funds was to
permit "employers to merge part of the corporate cost of retirement payments [with] the
statutory pension programs, thereby reducing overall labor costs" (Estevez-Abe 2001: 17).
The shift from lump-sum 'gratitude payments' financed out of a company's reserves toward
pension funds contracted out to a life insurer or trust bank that took place in the mid-1960s
was fostered by simultaneous changes in the tax system. While the tax exemptions for
those capital reserves that were earmarked for retirement benefits were significantly
reduced in the fiscal year 1962 (from 100 percent to 40 percent), the 1966 introduction of
employee pension funds and the 1962 introduction of Tax Qualified Pensions made it more
attractive for firms to provide income security for their retirees in these new ways, in
particular since the contributions of employers and employees to both schemes were made
fully tax deductible.
 
All this came together with a shift from individual to institutional shareholding that took
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place in the first half of the 1960s. This shift turned Japanese life insurance companies into
major institutional investors and thus strongly supported the emergence of patient
lender/borrower relationships in Japan. During the so-called 'securities recession' from
1961 to 1965, the Nikkei-index dropped at an annual rate of 14 percent after an
unprecedented boom period during which it had risen annually at an impressive 29 percent
from 1955 to 1961. Life insurers used the stock market recession to significantly increase
their ownership of shares (from 7.88 percent in 1964 to nearly 11 percent in 1966). [17]
Most importantly, life insurance companies became the largest shareholders of city banks
and major local banks (see the data given in Estevez-Abe 1997: 14). The occupation forces
had attempted to establish an 'equity democracy' by breaking up the old Zaibatsu and by
supporting dispersed individual shareholding along the lines of the American model. Yet,
during the baisse at the Tokyo stock market, the proportion of individual shareholding
dropped from 46.68 percent in 1963 to only 42.36 percent in 1967. Individual share
holding has been in constant decline since then and accounted for no more than 24 percent
in 1994 and even fell to 18.9 percent in 1998 (Kanda 1998: 928, 930, Table 2; Suto 2000:
13, Table 2), while banks (22 percent) and life insurance companies (11 percent) today
own 33 percent of all stock.
 
As an upshot of these developments, business relations between firms and life insurers
became very close. Life insurance companies became "key players in (...) stable
shareholding arrangements" (McKenzie 1992: 83) and an important source of 'patient,'
'modest,' 'silent' capital. While the life insurance companies themselves are mostly mutual
corporations and thus cannot be direct partners in cross-shareholding arrangements, [18]
pension contracts provided a functional equivalent to the 'mutual hostage-holding' between
listed firms in the form of reciprocal shareholding (McKenzie 1992). Japanese pension
fund sponsors allocated management business to trust banks and life insurance companies
of their industrial group under the condition that the life insurer or trust bank, in turn,
would buy shares of their company. Since competition in terms of performance between
the life insurance companies was strongly restricted by the MoF (see below), and since
market entry by new competitors was blocked as well - thus restricting the number of life
insurers to no more than twenty companies until the 1980s - life insurers were responsive
toward these demands (McKenzie 1992). This established long-term exchange relations in
which the "life insurer becomes a stable shareholder in a company and in return the
company has its employees buy pension schemes and group life insurance from this
particular insurer" (Baums/Schaede 1994: 639; McKenzie 1992: 85 and 92; Estevez-Abe
1997; Komiya 1994: 382, Fn. 7; Suto 2000).
 
Given that the rate of return from pension funds was set at a moderate annual 5.5 percent
for all funds, life insurers developed no particularly strong interest in the performance of
their portfolios as long as this official target was met. Profits from the increased value of
stocks were not passed on to policyholders, but were retained as latent earning (fukumieki;
see Probert 2001: 1). The officially mandated rate of return allowed fund managers to pool
just about all their pension fund assets, out of which all firms then received the same
proportional return. The lack of transparency due to the pooling of assets meant that
contracting firms lacked interest in the performance of their particular fund as well. This
was also caused by the relatively young age of the workforce in the 1950s and 1960s,
combined with the high growth rates during these years which made it easy to meet the
officially set 'rate of return'-target. Competition between insurance companies and banks
for the pension fund business in terms of performance was further restricted by the detailed
regulation of pension fund investment (5:3:3:2 rule). [19] Hence, life insurance companies
had no incentives to interfere much with a firm's management. They rather remained 'silent
partners' and therefore became a major source of patient capital for industry. The pension
fund business became part of the complex of 'total transactions' so characteristic for inter-
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company relations in the Japanese economic system. Given the tight state regulation of
competition and performance, Japanese pension funds did not develop into aggressive
institutional investors that pressed firms hard for a better rate of return. Only recently has
performance become a matter of greater concern. Furthermore, as long as companies could
count on a steady supply of patient and modest capital, hostile takeovers remained alien to
the Japanese economy. This, in turn, helped make the private commitments of companies
toward their labor force credible, since in the US-American mergers and acquisitions
business, pension plans were often terminated after the merger, and pension fund assets
"that remained after the satisfaction of all plan liabilities" were capitalized (Sass 1997:
283-84, Fn. 29). This asset-stripping endangers the long-term credibility of private pension
promises even if pension entitlements of employees are vested after a relatively short
period of time.
 
While the literature usually treats the Japanese and the US-American company pensions as
similar cases of private welfare, and while the high share of private social spending is often
said to justify a characterization of the Japanese social protection system as liberal and
residual, both systems do indeed follow an entirely different logic, as the reconstruction of
the incentive effects of the Japanese EPFs demonstrates. While Japanese pension capital
underpins stable relations between borrower and lender of capital with life insurance
companies and trust banks at the center of these stable relations, pension funds in the US
are among the most prominent institutional investors pressing firms hard for an ever better
rate of return. This supports the claim that in Japan as well as in the US "in many ways, the
design of 'funded' welfare programs shaped and was shaped by the prevailing financial
relations" (Estevez-Abe 1997: 8; emphasis added).
 
The importance of life insurance companies as major shareholders can be seen in Table 3.
Although British life insurance companies hold a similar percentage of the total of stocks
(see Table 3), one has to bear in mind that the number of firms in this sector is much
smaller in Japan than in Great Britain due to the strict market-entry control performed by
the MoF. Japanese banks held 26 percent of all common stocks in 1994, but there are more
than eighty banks, but only twenty-five life insurance companies, of which sixteen account
for most of the business. No more than twenty-one life insurance companies and seventeen
trust banks managed the entire Japanese pension fund business, comprising nearly 1,900
funds with about 12.1 million people enrolled as of March 1996 (roughly 38 percent of the
members of the EPS). The assets added up to 41.6 trillion Yen. While equities account only
for 27 percent of the portfolio of Japanese pension fund, the oligopolistic structure of the
industry concentrates economic power and influence in the hands of only a small number
of firms. Compared to the British and American funds (see Table 3), "a meager 16 mutual
life insurance companies are the most influential 'owners' of Japanese big business"
(Komiya 1994: 366). At the same time, Japanese life insurance companies have become an
important source for long-term credit. Since they are not only major shareholders, but also
provide long-term credit (see the share of bonds and loans of total assets in Table 4), they
have developed into central economic actors within the Japanese economic system.
Growing takeover fears of listed Japanese firms have even increased the importance of life
insurance companies as stable shareholders in the 1980s and 1990s (Komiya 1994: 382).
[20]
 
 
Table 3: Ownership of common stock (percent at year end)
 
 
Germany
(1993)
Japan
(FY 1994)
UK
(1993)
US
(1994)
1. Financial sector 29 44 62 45
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1.1 Banks 14 26 1 3
1.2 Insurance companies 7 16 17 4
1.3 Investment funds 0 0 0 0
1.4 Pension funds 0 0 34 26
1.5 Mutual funds 8 0 7 12
2. Non-financial sector 72 56 39 55
2.1 Non-financial enterprises 39 24 2 0
2.2 Public authorities 4 1 1 0
2.3 Individuals 17 24 18 48
2.4 Foreign 12 7 16 6
Source: See below, Table 4
 
 
Table 4: Portfolio composition of pension funds in the UK, US, Japan, and Germany
 
Equities Bonds 
and loans
Property Liquidity 
and deposits
Of which
foreign assets
UK 80 11 6 3 30
US 48 38 0 7 10
Germany 11 75 11 3 6
Japan 27 61 2 3 7
Source: Davis (1998: 97)
 
 
Yet, this arrangement, which had been so beneficial for key economic actors in the first
three postwar decades, came with costs. These became ever more visible in the 1980s and
1990s. The relatively poor rate of return from Japanese pension funds is the prime example
for a potential long-run trade-off between the 'productivity of industry' and the 'profitability
of investments' in a coordinated political economy. If the cooperative outcome of the
capital/labor game is based upon the credible commitment that profits will remain 'within
the firm' and will be reinvested (Eichengreen 1994), [21] this can 'trap' capital if
investments in the traditional industrial sectors do not translate any more into high
economic growth. In other words, the cooperative equilibrium proved advantageous during
the initial period of catch-up, when rapid productivity increases in the key manufacturing
sectors set the whole economy on a high growth path. However, the structural change from
an industrial to a service economy and the rise of vibrant new industrial sectors like the
software- and internet-industry are trends to which the German and Japanese coordinated
economies have responded much less impressively.
 
The effects for pension finance are clearly visible today. That pension capital figured as a
prime source of patient investment capital meant to sacrifice a good rate of return.
Estimations hold that in 1994, 29 percent of all EP funds were underfunded on a
book-value basis and 56 percent at market value (Davis 1995: 101). Sacrificing optimal
performance of pension funds in a rapidly aging society like the Japanese necessarily leads
into a financial crisis of the pension system. Poor performance was a result first of all of
tight state regulation of investments: Unlike in the US, where pension funds are relatively
free in their investment behavior, the way in which Japanese fund managers can invest
pension capital is limited to stocks, bonds, cash deposits, and real estate (see above).
Furthermore, the MoF's practice of 'guiding' the investments of life insurance companies
has contributed to poor pension fund performance as well. While in the 1950s and 1960s
the MoF guided EPF investments into targeted sectors (especially electricity, steel, coal,
and shipbuilding) and into public housing (more than 40 percent of all loans were granted
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upon governmental request; Estevez-Abe 1997: 11), in the 1990s, life insurance companies
were regularly urged by the MoF to invest into the Tokyo Stock Exchange when very few
institutional investors were willing to enter the sluggish Japanese market (cf. Murdo 1993:
14). The MoF also used the capital of Postal Savings and of the Employee Pension System
for these 'price-keeping operations' without showing much concern for the poor returns
resulting from these interventions. With respect to the political influence exerted on the
investment behavior of Employee Pension Funds, one may even speak of the Japanese
government's 'third budget' besides the FILP and the official 'first' budget (cf. Estevez-Abe
2001).
 
Moreover, pension fund assets were valued at their historic costs rather than at the actual
market value. While this helped fund managers conceal losses caused by the enormous fall
in asset prices in the early 1990s, it also inflated the value of the shares held in the
portfolio since many stocks had been bought during the stock market 'bubble' of the 1980s.
This meant that pension fund managers could not invest in the stock market when prices
were low since their overvalued old portfolio already bumped up against the maximum 30
percent ceiling that regulators allow fund managers to invest in stock. Fund managers also
had problems to sell poorly performing blue chips in order to invest into more dynamic
industries or new firms, since this would have meant to acknowledge undeclared losses
incurred since the 1980s and would have forced firms to raise pension contributions, a step
that all involved, fund managers as well as companies, wanted to avoid. Thus, capital
remained trapped in the old firms. [22] What is more, the low interest rate policy employed
by the government to stimulate economic recovery also reduced the interest paid on bonds
and thus further depressed pension fund performance. For instance, average revenue from
pension fund assets had been at 5.74 percent in 1997. In the financial year 1998,
investment return for the overall pension funds dived to 2.49 percent sending the pension
funds into the worst fiscal condition since the Kosei Nenkin Kikin fund system was
introduced in 1966 (Jiji Press, April 14, 2000). Many firms had to register negative pension
fund yield. Due to a strong increase in stock prices, the return of pension funds in 1999
was much better, but the recent drop of the Nikkei index again puts pension funds and life
insurance companies under serious stress. Because of the sharp reduction in asset prices
after the burst of the bubble economy, the annual average yield of Japanese pension funds
calculated from 1984 to 1996 was practically zero, compared with an annual return of 9
percent in the United States over the same period (EU 1999: 45, Appendix 2; cf. Suto
2000: 18, Fn. 14). US-American pension funds not only produced a much higher yield, but
often were so profitable that revenues overcompensated the company payments set aside
for pensions, thus contributing positively to consolidated corporate earnings (Clark et al.
2000: 8-9). Owing to the negative yield gap, i.e. the low return from pension assets but high
guaranteed insurance premiums for the insured, seven Japanese life insurance companies
have already been forced out of business (Nissan Mutual [1997], Toho Mutual [1999],
Taisho Life, Dai-hyaku Mutual, Chiyoda Mutual and Kyoei [2000; the insolvency of Kyoei
Life with a debt of 4.53 trillion Yen was as yet the largest insolvency in Japan's postwar
history], Tokyo Mutual Life [2001]; see Probert 2001: 5 and FAZ 24.03.2001). A similar
trend can be observed for pension funds themselves. The number of dissolved funds has
steeply increased since the second half of the 1990s (starting with one dissolved fund in
1994, one in 1995, seven in 1996, fourteen in 1997, eighteen in 1998 and twenty-three in
1999; Suto 2000: 22, Table 7, and Japan Economic Newswire, 13 May 2000).
 
The increasing maturity of the existing public and private pension schemes and the
unfavorable demographic trends are, of course, the most salient factors that have rendered
the status quo increasingly unattractive. The trade-off between an interest in good
performance of pension funds and in upholding the traditional stable shareholding relations
thus has become more costly.
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Yet, the political measures taken in response to these growing problems since the
mid-1980s reacted primarily to external pressures (Higachi/Lauter 1990: 268-269). Since
the early 1980s the 'domestic market outsiders', Japanese securities firms, combined forces
with 'foreign outsiders', in particular U.S. banks, and "pressured the Ministry of Finance to
deregulate" the pension market (ibid.: 268). Deregulation of the Japanese pension market
then became a prominent topic in the U.S./Japan trade negotiations in 1983-84 headed by
finance Minister N. Takeshita and Secretary of the Treasury D. Regan. Against
considerable resistance of the domestic banking and insurance sector the MoF finally
aggreed to the admission of foreign banks to the pension market - either alone or in
cooperation with Japanese trust banks. "Not to be left out, securities firms and other
foreign institutions created investment advisory companies to interact with the pension
fund market" (ibid. 269). These advisory firms were granted market access starting in
1990. This marked the beginning of the opening up of the Japanese pension market - a
process that has accelerated considerably over the course of the 1990s.
 
Several domestic trends have fuelled this development. Because the 'silent shareholders' in
the past have not claimed a large share of corporate profits, many firms were able to
accumulate their own internal capital, which now finances their investments. There is clear
indication that the role of banks as the main provider of investment capital for companies
has been in steady decline since the 1980s and that Japanese firms today are no more
dependent on bank debt than US-American companies (Yafeh 2000: 79, Table 1). A similar
if perhaps less spectacular trend seems to hold true for the traditional stable shareholding
arrangements (see Fn. 21). Also the booming stock market in the 1980s made it easier for
firms to resort to equity finance and to invest their internal funds into stocks or to issue
bonds to raise capital. Moreover, an increasing number of Japanese firms now have
overseas operations and prefers to raise capital in local currencies to eliminate exchange
risks.
 
Given that 'equity finance' has gained in importance over 'debt finance' and that an
increasing number of Japanese firms are internationally listed, American accounting
standards have become more important for Japanese firms as well. Especially in keeping
with the No. 87 US Federal Accounting Standards, Japanese firms have begun to disclose
their pension fund deficits (Miyake 1998: 2). This, in turn, adds more pressure to quickly
improve pension fund performance and to substitute defined contribution schemes for the
traditional defined benefit schemes. This is only one among several reasons why especially
US-American and British investment houses were successful in expanding their market
shares in the huge Japanese pension fund market lately. Starting from zero in 1990 when
the deregulation of the Japanese pension market began, the market share of pension
managers other than the traditional life insurance companies and trust banks had reached
14 percent by the end of 1998, and especially foreign companies have benefited from this
trend because of their better performance (Pensions & Investments 1998, Nov.: 16). In
1998, foreign companies already held 30 percent of the investment advisory business. An
increase in the number of business partnerships between foreign and Japanese asset
managers (e.g. Dresdner Kleinwort Benson with Meiji-Life Insurance, Putnam with Nippon
Life, and Alliance Capital with Sumito Trust) is just another indication of the profound
changes within the pension fund market toward a much more performance-oriented Anglo-
American model of corporate finance and governance. Another opportunity for market
entry by foreign firms has been the numerous bankruptcies that have occurred recently
among Japanese life insurer (see above). [23] A corresponding 'internationalization' of the
pension business results because Japanese trust banks and life insurance companies are
pressured to increase their holding of foreign stocks (after the tight MoF-regulation with
respect to their portfolio composition has been abolished). The revenue on domestic stock
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and assets nowadays is too poor to even meet the moderate 5.5 percent return target
traditionally set by the Ministry of Finance. This forces "Japanese financial institutions to
direct their investment to where it can achieve the highest returns, not simply to outdated
keiretsu-partners" (Katz 1999: 98).
 
The reform of the Japanese pension system has proceeded so far in a piecemeal fashion.
However, liberalization accelerated over the course of the 1990s, and today the various
steps add up to a quite significant change. To name but a few of these reforms: In the Fiscal
Year (FY) 1990 foreign banks and investment advisory companies were allowed to
compete for the administration of newly founded pension funds as one of the measures
agreed upon in the U.S./Japan trade negotiations in the mid-1980s. Market entry was
extended for foreign insurance companies in the wake of the US/Japan Structural
Impediment Initiative in 1991-2 until the market was being completely opened for foreign
investment firms due to the US-Japan Financial Services Agreement in 1995. In FY 1996
the 5-3-3-2 rule was revised, in 1998 the rule was abolished altogether. The year 1997 saw
the introduction of segmented accounting and the introduction of market-value accounting.
Pension funds were allowed to set independently expected pension fund yield on the basis
of the maturity and risk of the fund. Starting in 1996, companies with funds with capital
above 50 million Yen were allowed to administer their funds internally; since June 2000,
this rule has been extended to smaller funds as well, and the provision that restricted
investments of these in-house funds solely to domestic government bonds was abolished.
In October 1999, the Pension Fund Association (PFA) allowed fund managers to put
money into 'alternative investments' including derivatives, venture capital- or buyout-
vehicles or hedge funds. It has also issued guidelines urging trust banks and life insurance
companies to exercise their voting rights at shareholder meetings "in consideration of the
investment returns to pension funds". Next reform steps will include the deregulation of
Tax Qualified Pensions holding assets of about 22 trillion Yen (about $180 billion) as of
1998. Moreover, postal savings and pension fund capital will not be administered anymore
by the Trust Fund Bureau of the MoF. Since FY 2000, new accounting standards force
Japanese firms to declare all their retirement liabilities on their balance sheets in
accordance with US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Nonfunded
pension liabilities will have to be amortized within the next fifteen years starting from FY
2000. The Japanese diet passed a law in early 2000 permitting firms to set up 401(k)-style
pensions schemes, although tax incentives in support of these new defined contribution
schemes are not as favorable as in the US. [24]
 
This incomplete list of reforms of the Japanese pension system indicates that the general
trend in the Japanese private pension market clearly goes in the direction of the Anglo-
American shareholder model of corporate governance. This has already provoked calls to
legislate a Japanese equivalent to the US Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) since the old guarantees for the security of pension entitlements that were based
on inter-firm coordination and stable shareholding seem to quickly evaporate. While these
reforms will certainly make the Japanese pension sector much more effective and will yield
higher returns on pension capital, they will also undermine the old practices of cross-
shareholding and the role of life insurance companies and trust banks as patient and silent
providers of long-term credit to Japanese firms, which will have important consequences
for the Japanese stakeholder model of corporate governance.
 
 
4 Summary
 
In this paper I have argued that the systems of social protection have played an often
ignored, yet very important role in the coordinated political economies of Germany and
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Japan. They were critical for upholding long-term economic coordination between capital
and labor, and this coordination lay at the heart of the stunning economic success of both
countries in the first three postwar decades (Eichengreen 1994). Particularly the pension
systems of the two countries, dissimilar as they are, have provided firms with patient
capital and have allowed firms to credibly commit themselves to the promise to reinvest
profits in exchange for workers wage moderation, thus setting the German and Japanese
economy on a spectacular high growth, high productivity trajectory in the 1950s and
1960s. In various additional ways, both the public German and the private but tightly
regulated Japanese pension system have allowed firms and workers to enter into long-term
economic coordination: the pension systems supported long job tenure through seniority
related benefits (Oshio/Yashiro 1997), offered complete status protection in case of
dismissals, were obviously able to alleviate union collective action problems posed by
wage moderation by securing intergenerational fairness, and provided workers with
incentives to invest in industry-specific and/or firm-specific skills (cf. Estevez-Abe et al.
1999).
 
Today's crisis of both models of economic coordination has spilled over into the welfare
state and appears here in form of a financial crisis. As has been shown in the preceding
sections, the political attempts to tackle this financial crisis, in turn, have profound
feedback-effects on the traditional, non-liberal forms of corporate finance and governance
in Germany and Japan exactly because 'protection' and 'production' were so intimately
intertwined in both postwar economies. All the available evidence on the direction of the
recent welfare- and, more specifically, pension-reforms suggests that these reforms will not
counteract, but will contribute, mostly deliberately contribute to the further erosion of the
traditional business practices in Germany and Japan. Both countries have, albeit to
different degrees, begun to embrace "pension fund capitalism" (Clark 2000) Anglo-
American style. Yet, we should not necessarily expect simple convergence on the Anglo-
American model. In Germany, the establishment and administration of company pensions
falls under the co-determination law. Hence, the increased importance of pension funds
due to the 2001 pension reform may also prove advantageous for the German unions. In
Japan, the dissolution of the old inter-company ties and the conversion of the life insurance
companies and 'investment advisors' into revenue-maximizing institutional investors may
result in a "fusion between a market-based system and a relationship-oriented system" of
corporate finance (Suto 2000: 33) rather than lead to a simple copy of the American
model, given that pension funds themselves still cannot exercise their shareholder rights
and investment decisions directly but remain dependent on financial intermediaries (ibid.).
Despite these retarding moments, we can clearly trace a process of fundamental change in
German and Japanese corporate finance. The established practices of economic
coordination in both countries have become endangered species within a new economic
environment that has put them at an evolutionary disadvantage.
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1 Market capitalization of publicly quoted domestic companies in percent of GDP, 1985
 
 US UK Japan Germany
Gross 51 90 71 29
Net CrossHoldings 48 81 37 14
Source: Wenger/Kaserer (1998: 505).
 
 
2 'Defined benefit' pensions (DB) represent a fixed 'payment promise,' they define the
amount paid out, i.e. the benefit (like $500 monthly or 70 % of the last wage), while
'defined contribution' pensions (DC) only define the amount paid in. Pension entitlements
then depend on how these contributions have been invested. In the DB case, the entire risk
remains with the side that grants the pension; in the DC case, the risk is borne entirely by
the side that receives the pension payment.
 
3 Following the general hypothesis that there "seems to be a strong interdependence
between the size, the strength and importance of national equity markets and the national
old-age systems" (Hauck 1994: 556).
 
4 Again, the high tax level in postwar West Germany was due to the felt need to massively
invest into housing, infrastructure, etc. and to restrict consumption (see Shonfield 1965:
265-269). Moreover, the German Ministry of Finance systematically underestimated the
rate of growth and consequentially the overall tax revenue.
 
5 In this context it is important to note that even the Nazis had substantially curtailed the
importance of the stock market in the wake of the war economy; (cf. Boelke 1985).
 
6 Stocks accounted for only about 1.9 % of all private investments in 1949 and 1950, while
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retained profits and short-term credit accounted for about 70 % in 1949 and 53.4 % in
1950 (Adamsen 1981: 257).
 
7 Since the German pension insurance was much more mature than the Japanese Employee
Pension System, the misuse of its capital for war financing had much more devastating
consequences (Manow 1997; Boelke 1985). While war financing was one of the prime
goals that had stood behind the establishment of the Japanese EPS as well (cf. Collick
1988: 210), the level of contributions and the amount of accumulated capital in the EPS
paled when compared to the German pension schemes.
 
8 The blue-collar and white-collar old-age insurance funds were mandated to invest at least
a quarter of their capital assets in government securities.
 
9 Shonfield simply erred when he wrote that "German social security funds have a quite
unusual freedom in the conduct of their investment policy" (Shonfield 1965: 270).
 
10 Employers' freedom in the design of company pension schemes was further restricted in
1989 by the European Court of Justice that ruled against exclusive eligibility to company
pensions for the long-term and full-time (i.e. predominantly male) employed in the name of
women's equal workplace rights (Tegtmeier 1992).
 
11 Since 1974, entitlements were vested after ten years (before only after fifteen years).
The 2001 reform will require only five years.
 
12 The contribution rate had been stable at 14 % for the first ten years after the major
1957 pension reform.
 
13 Defined benefit private pension schemes as well as wage-indexed public pensions
surmount "problems of intergenerational equity" between different cohorts of workers in
the case of wage coordination/wage moderation (Eichengreen 1994: 49). "Wage
moderation now which translated into higher incomes later might benefit future generations
at the expense of present ones, a fact which might cause those currently working to
hesitate to defer their gratification. Governments therefore indexed pensions not just to
changes in the cost of living, but to increases in the living standards of the currently
employed" (ibid.).
 
14 Unions and large German employers like Volkswagen have already declared that they
will establish defined contribution pension funds. At the same time, the association of
German mechanical engineering firms (VDMA) complains about the retreat of banks from
the traditional credit business. The predominantly small- and medium-sized firms in this
sector are mostly not listed, have a thin capital stock, and act in a volatile environment.
They therefore depend on long-term, 'patient' credit.
 
15 For the small firms outside the EPF system, this was still an option and the "popularity
of book reserve plans in Japan [among small firms; P.M.] despite of their unfavourable tax
treatment indicates the high value that firms appear to place on the availability of this form
of corporate financing" (Turner/Watanabe 1995: 57).
 
16 In terms of comparative market penetration, foreign insurers in major European markets
hold a much higher percentage than foreign insurers in Japan, e.g., in 1996, 13% in France,
33% in Italy, and 19% in the UK. Foreign insurers in Japan have about 2.7% (EU 1997).
 
17 While the anti-monopoly law as of 1947 ruled that firms are not allowed to own more
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 than 5 % of a firm's stock and life- insurance companies no more than 10 %, these
restrictions do not seem to have been generally binding.
 
18 Only four of the twenty Japanese life insurance companies are joint stock companies.
These four firms are rather small in size and have much lower economic importance than
the mutual companies (Komiya 1994: 366-367, 379).
 
19 Minimum: 50 % bonds and loans; maximum: 30 % equity, 30 % foreign denominated
assets, 20 % property/real estate.
 
20 According to one estimation, 44 % of all equities were part of stable shareholding
arrangements around 1980, 51 % around 1990 ? a number which has declined today to an
estimated 40 % (FAZ 2001 January 16., p. 29). Suto (2000: 14, Table 3) reports the
following data: 41.1 % of all shares in 1990 were part of stable shareholding arrangements,
but only 35.7 % in 1997. Of course these numbers have to be interpreted with caution.
 
21 In Germany, company pensions in the form of book reserves represented the promise
that profits would remain within the firm, in Japan the 'functional equivalent' was the
contracting out of pension funds to a life insurer or trust bank in exchange for the purchase
of shares of the contracting company by a fund-managing firm.
 
22 To put it the other way around: stable shareholding or bank finance and bank-dominated
corporate governance are apparently "suitable for the financing of 'traditional'
manufacturing industries, but [are] not appropriate for financing innovation. When the
technology is novel and unknown, a large and liquid stock market with a 'diversity of
opinions' is required to evaluate future prospects" (Yafeh 2000: 80).
 
23 See the following takeovers or merges among 'unequals' AXA - Nippon Dantai; Aetna -
Heiwa; GE Edison - Toho; Manulife - Dai-hyaku; Artemis - Aoba Life.; AIG - Nissan
Mutual Chiyoda; Prudential - Kyoei; Winterthur - Nicos Life; etc. (see Probert 2001: 5,
Fn. 5).
 
24 With the increasing number of mergers, hostile takeovers and bankruptcies, the risk of
'defined benefit'-schemes have increased, which makes the investment risks in 'defined
contribution'-schemes look less serious. In FY 1999, of the twenty-three pension funds that
were discontinued, seven were suspended because of corporate mergers (Japan Economic
Newswire, 13 May 2000).
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